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Looking for the “Priceless Child”  
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PETER GOSSAGE*
This essay explores the legal rights and responsibilities of fathers as they were 
interpreted by Quebec’s civil courts between 1921 and 1960. The focus is on 59 
published cases in which fathers were named as plaintiffs or defendants in actions 
where legal damages were sought in relation to incidents that involved their 
children, as either victims or authors of harmful acts. These lawsuits are analysed 
with specific reference to two key concepts, Viviana Zelizer’s Priceless Child 
(1985) and Christopher Dummitt’s Manly Modern (2007), with the latter found 
more useful for understanding the changing dynamics of masculine parenthood 
in this period.
 Ce texte traite des droits et responsabilités juridiques des pères tels que les ont 
interprétés les tribunaux civils du Québec de 1921 à 1960. L’analyse porte sur 59 
litiges ayant fait jurisprudence où les pères sont impliqués soit comme demandeurs 
soit comme défendeurs. Il s’agit de causes dans lesquelles des dommages-intérêts 
légaux sont réclamés relativement à des incidents impliquant leurs enfants comme 
victimes ou comme auteurs d’actes préjudiciables. Ces poursuites sont analysées 
en faisant spécifiquement référence à deux notions clés : celle de Priceless Child, 
de Viviana Zelizer (1985), et celle de Manly Modern de Christopher Dummitt 
(2007), cette dernière s’avérant plus utile pour comprendre l’évolution de la 
dynamique de la parentalité masculine au cours de cette période.
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THE HISTORICAL study of fathers and fatherhood provides a unique opportunity 
to situate men as gendered subjects within the domestic realm and to explore 
the complex dynamics through which they have understood and performed their 
roles as both men and parents.1 Part of a broader exploration of these issues in 
the context of twentieth-century Quebec, this essay seeks to address the legal 
rights, status, and obligations of Quebec fathers in the four decades prior to 
1960. During this period, the beliefs, behaviours, and institutions associated with 
twentieth-century modernity made significant inroads in Quebec, notwithstanding 
the slow pace of institutional reform under Maurice Duplessis and the profound 
conservatism of the Catholic Church, especially in the areas of family, gender, and 
sexuality.2 In particular, the tensions between traditional and modern conceptions 
of familial roles and gender identities were building, as major debates played out 
over adoption, women’s suffrage, married women’s wages, mandatory school 
attendance, and family allowances and as pressure mounted for the major reforms 
of the Civil Code that would come in the 1960s and 1970s.3 At the same time, 
1 The British and American literatures in this area are especially rich. See, for example, Robert L. Griswold, 
Fatherhood in America: A History (New York: Basic Books, 1993); Laura King, Family Men: Fatherhood 
and Masculinity in Britain, 1914-1960 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); Ralph LaRossa, The 
Modernization of Fatherhood: A Social and Political History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1997); Margaret Marsh, “Suburban Men and Masculine Domesticity, 1870-1915,” American Quarterly, 
vol. 40 (1988), pp. 165-186; John Tosh, “Authority and Nurture in Middle-Class Fatherhood: The Case of 
Early and Mid-Victorian England,” Gender & History, vol. 8, no. 1 (1996), pp. 48-64. For English Canada, 
see Cynthia Comacchio, “‘A Postscript for Father:’ Defining a New Fatherhood in Interwar Canada,” 
Canadian Historical Review, vol. 78, no. 3 (1997), pp. 385-408; Christopher Dummitt, “Finding a Place 
for Father: Selling the Barbecue in Postwar Canada,” Journal of the Canadian Historical Association, 
vol. 9 (1998), pp. 209-223. See also the inspiring series of articles and chapters by Robert Rutherdale: 
“Fatherhood and Masculine Domesticity During the Baby Boom: Consumption and Leisure in Advertising 
and Life Stories” in Lori Chambers and Edgar-André Montigny, eds., Family Matters: Papers in Post-
Confederation Canadian Family History (Toronto: Canadian Scholars’ Press 1998), pp. 309-333; “New 
‘Faces’ for Fathers: Memory, Life Writing, and Fathers as Providers in the Postwar Consumer Era” in 
Magda Fahrni and Robert Rutherdale, eds., Creating Postwar Canada: Community, Diversity, and Dissent, 
1945-1975 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2008), pp. 241-267; and “Three Faces of 
Fatherhood as a Masculine Category: Tyrants, Teachers, and Workaholics as ‘Responsible Family Men’ 
During Canada’s Baby Boom” in John H. Arnold and Sean Brady, eds., What is Masculinity? Historical 
Dynamics from Antiquity to the Contemporary World (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 
pp. 323-348. For an attempt to place the more limited Quebec literature in its international context, see 
Peter Gossage, “Au nom du père? Rethinking the History of Fatherhood in Quebec,” American Review of 
Canadian Studies, vol. 44, no.1 (Spring 2014), pp. 49-67.
2 See Peter Gossage and J. I. Little, An Illustrated History of Quebec: Tradition and Modernity (Don Mills: 
Oxford University Press, 2012), especially chap. 9 and 10, where we develop this argument at length for 
the decades prior to 1960.
3 I refer here to two significant reforms of the Civil Code: one in 1964, which expanded women’s citizenship 
rights, and a second in 1977, when the legal concept of la puissance paternelle finally gave way to the 
gender-inclusive autorité parentale in Quebec family law. For the more modest reforms of marriage law 
implemented in 1931, see Maryse Beaulieu, “La condition juridique de la femme mariée (1907-1931) : 
salaire et communauté. Position de Marie Lacoste Gérin-Lajoie,” Recherches féministes, vol. 14, no. 1 
(2001), pp. 5-14. For a legal perspective on changing conceptions of parental authority, see Nicole Roy, 
“L’autorité parentale et l’obligation alimentaire des parents envers leur enfant : deux institutions proposant 
une conception de l’intérêt de l’enfant et de la famille,” Revue du barreau, vol. 61 (Spring 2001), pp. 
51-183. On adoption, see especially Denyse Baillargeon, “Orphans in Quebec: On the Margins of Which 
Family?” in Nancy Christie and Michael Gauvreau, eds., Mapping the Margins: The Family and Social 
Discipline in Canada, 1700-1975 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004), 
pp. 305-326. On school attendance and family allowance, see Dominique Marshall, The Social Origins 
of the Welfare State: Québec Families, Compulsory Education, and Family Allowances, 1940-1955, trans. 
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modern ideas around fatherhood—implying more egalitarian relations within the 
family and a more nurturing role for men with respect to their children—were 
gaining currency across North America including, as Vincent Duhaime has shown 
for the period after 1945, in Quebec.4 
 It is well worth asking, then, how tensions or contradictions between different 
conceptions of paternal rights and obligations were negotiated on the ground, 
through the application in the courts of the Civil Law, in the 40 years prior to the 
Quiet Revolution. Toward that end, and building on the work of legal historians 
such as Cynthia Fish and Guillaume Saudrais,5 I have assembled a collection of 
case reports from the province’s law journals, selected on the basis of their specific 
engagement with a wide range of issues around paternal authority, rights, and 
responsibilities.6 The particular focus in this essay is a set of 59 civil suits in which 
claims for damages were made either by or against Quebec fathers, which I propose 
to examine with the following questions in mind: What sort of compensation 
could a father expect, and on what legal basis, should his minor child be killed 
or injured as a result of someone else’s transgression? Conversely, where did a 
father’s responsibility for the harmful acts of his minor children begin and end? 
Could he be held accountable before the law for failing to provide the education 
and vigilance that might have prevented a child’s dangerous behaviour? Finally, 
how, if at all, did these dynamics evolve in Quebec between 1921 and 1960? In the 
process, I will use key concepts borrowed from two scholars—Viviana Zelizer’s 
“priceless child” and Christopher Dummitt’s “manly modern”—as a means of 
linking these cases to broader ideas about parenting and masculinity and the shifts 
underway in both of these areas from the 1920s to the 1950s.
Dads as Plaintiffs: Pricing the Priceless Child
The case reports consulted for this project are full of heartbreaking stories about 
families who had suffered a tragic loss—the accidental death of a child—and 
about their efforts to collect monetary compensation from the people found 
legally responsible for those accidents.7 Eric Reiter has demonstrated the strong 
Nicola Doone Danby (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2006).
4 Vincent Duhaime, “La construction du père québécois : le discours du mouvement familial et l’expérience 
des pères, 1945-1965” (MA thesis, History, Université de Montréal, 2000) and “‘Les pères ont ici leur 
devoir’: le discours du mouvement familial québécois et la construction de la paternité dans l’après-
guerre, 1945-1960,” Revue d’histoire de l’Amérique française, vol. 57, no. 4 (2004), pp. 535-566. See also 
Michelle Roy, “L’Évolution de la figure paternelle dans les publicités du journal sherbrookois, La Tribune, 
au XXe siècle” (MA thesis, History, Université de Sherbrooke, 2007); Gossage, “Au nom du père?”
5 Cynthia Fish, “La puissance paternelle et les cas de garde d’enfants au Québec, 1866-1928,” Revue 
d’histoire de l’Amérique française, vol. 57, no. 4 (2004), pp. 509-533; Guillaume Saudrais, “Maris et pères 
devant les tribunaux civils québécois, 1900-1920” (MA thesis, History, Université de Sherbrooke, 2010). 
6 Funding for this research was provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of 
Canada in the context of the project Pères et paternité au Québec, 1900-1960. Further studies supported by 
that grant include Saudrais, “Maris et pères devant les tribunaux civils”; Gossage, “Au nom du père?”; and 
Peter Gossage, “Celebrating the Family Man: From Father’s Day to La Fête des Pères, 1910-1969” in Peter 
Gossage and Robert Rutherdale, eds., Masculine Histories in the Making: Emerging Themes in Canada 
(forthcoming 2018 with University of British Columbia Press).
7 The literature on the accidental death of children in Quebec is not vast, but, for an insightful study based 
on Coroners’ reports, see Catherine Cournoyer, “Les accidents impliquant des enfants et l’attitude envers 
l’enfance à Montréal (1900-1945)” (MA thesis, History, Université de Montréal, 1999).
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ambivalence within the province’s legal community around Solatium Doloris—
literally, solace for pain.8 There was contradiction within Quebec’s hybrid legal 
tradition between the French custom, which allowed compensation for the 
emotional suffering, or “moral prejudice,” attendant upon a child’s death, and 
English law and jurisprudence, which did not. The legal question was formally 
resolved in an 1887 ruling by the Supreme Court of Canada, which favoured 
the English interpretation.9 As Reiter shows, however, Quebec’s judges used a 
range of arguments to mitigate the ostensible rigidity of the law, which permitted 
compensation only for the direct costs associated with a child’s death (such as 
funeral and burial costs and medical bills) and for the pecuniary advantages and 
value, based mainly on a child’s expected earning potential, that were lost on the 
occasion of his or her untimely death.10
 The American sociologist Viviana A. Zelizer has provided a useful framework 
in which to situate the tension between emotional and material losses associated 
with the accidental death of a child. In Pricing the Priceless Child, Zelizer argues 
persuasively that, as the economic value of children declined in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, the emotional or sentimental value invested in them 
by their parents and by society at large increased exponentially. Meanwhile, 
attaching a price to this socially and culturally determined value—as judges 
and juries were forced to do in awarding damages in civil suits for wrongful 
death—became extremely difficult and occasionally controversial, since the cold, 
pecuniary logic of the “useful child” had lost its economic basis in the Progressive 
Era, with its emphasis on child welfare and child protection.11
 Zelizer locates the key shifts in American ideas around the value of children 
in an earlier period (1870-1930) than the one under scrutiny here (1921-1960). 
She does push her analysis of child death suits into the 1950s, however, arguing 
that, as the century progressed, sentimental considerations were entering into 
judicial rulings in two specific ways: directly, as when individual states passed 
legislation to allow bereaved parents to claim damages for their emotional 
anguish and distress; and indirectly, as when the definition of “pecuniary loss” 
was expanded “to include compensation for the loss of society or companionship 
of a child” or more generally as more and more substantial awards were made, 
even in states where there was no legal basis for compensating parents for their 
emotional suffering.12 Was a similar process of pushing the boundaries of the law 
underway in Quebec at the same time? Reiter’s analysis of the judicial ambivalence 
8 Eric Reiter, “Les Familles, le chagrin et le droit. Les tribunaux québécois entre la tradition du droit civil et 
la Cour Suprême du Canada” (paper presented to the Institut d’histoire de l’Amérique française, Quebec 
City, October 18, 2014); Viviana Zelizer, Pricing the Priceless Child: The Changing Social Value of 
Children (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994 [1985]), p.140.
9 Reiter, “Les Familles, le chagrin et le droit”; Canadian Pacific Ry Co v. Robinson (1887), 14 SCR 105, June 
20, 1887. This restriction on the awarding of moral damages was overturned in 1996 when the Supreme 
Court awarded compensation for emotional suffering to the mother of Anthony Griffin, a young Black 
man who had been shot and killed by a Montreal police officer; see Supreme Court of Canada, Augustus v. 
Gosset (1996), 3 SCR 268, October 3, 1996.
10 Reiter, “Les Familles, le chagrin et le droit.”
11 Zelizer, Pricing the Priceless Child, pp. 138-168.
12 Ibid., pp. 145-155.
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surrounding Solatium Doloris certainly suggests as much. So too does my reading 
of 25 civil suits launched between 1921 and 1960 by bereaved fathers seeking 
financial compensation for the wrongful deaths of their children.
 Although my main interest is in minor children (the average age of the 
victims in these cases is 12 years), suits for the wrongful death of older offspring, 
especially sons with “good prospects,” were quite common.13 Given the persistent 
legal construction of children as financial assets whose loss would entail material 
hardship, it is not surprising to find so many male teenagers and young adults in 
this collection. Indeed, of the 26 victims in this collection all but five were boys 
or young men.14 Male children were both easier to present in court as potential 
wage-earners and statistically more likely to fall victim to accidental death, in 
an era when modern industrial and transportation technologies were introducing 
new risks and transforming older patterns of work, play, and daily life.15 Such was 
definitely the case for the six workplace fatalities in this collection, including the 
1927 explosion that cost the life of 21-year-old Léo Leboeuf, who was struck by 
debris scattered during a Valleyfield dredging operation.16 It also seems to apply 
to the traffic accidents to which a slim majority of these children (16 of the 26) 
had fallen victim. This trend, by the way, is consistent with Catherine Cournoyer’s 
analysis for Montreal, which shows a marked rise after 1920 in the proportion of 
child deaths resulting from traffic accidents, most now involving cars or trucks, 
rather than tramways or horse-drawn vehicles as in the preceding decades.17
 All too typical was the case of eight-year-old Jacqueline Joleaud, who had 
been riding her tricycle on a sidewalk in Outremont on November 21, 1929, at 
5:00 in the afternoon: the most dangerous time of day for children in the streets 
of North American cities.18 As she attempted to cross Querbes Street, Jacqueline 
was struck and killed by a car driven on the wrong side of the road by a man 
13 The victims in these cases ranged in age from 18 months to 23 years. Minor children throughout this period 
were those aged less than 21 years; the age of majority in Quebec was lowered from 21 to 18 in 1971.
14 There were 26 victims in these 25 cases because one involved two brothers killed simultaneously in a 
boating accident. The number of girls among these victims (5 out of 26 or just under 20%) matches the 
proportion of girls among children killed by accident outside the home in Montreal between 1900 and 
1945, which was 18%. The gender distribution for children killed in domestic accidents was much more 
balanced: 46% girls to 54% boys. See Cournoyer, “Les accidents impliquant des enfants,” Tables VII and 
VIII, pp. 58 and 60.
15 The competition for urban space between new technologies and children’s bodies is one of the central 
themes in Cournoyer’s study; see “Les accidents impliquant des enfants,” especially pp. 45-76. On the 
emergence of an accident-prevention discourse and infrastructure in early twentieth-century Quebec, see 
Magda Fahrni, “‘La lutte contre l’accident’: risque et accidents dans un contexte de modernité industrielle” 
in David Niget and Martin Petitclerc, eds., Pour une histoire du risque : Québec, France, Belgique (Quebec 
City: Les Presses de l’Université du Québec, 2012), pp. 181-202. 
16 Wilfrid Leboeuf v. Montreal Cottons, Limited, La Revue de jurisprudence, vol. 34 (1928), pp. 321-331. 
17 Cournoyer, “Les accidents impliquant des enfants,” Tables IV and V, pp. 48 and 52.
18 Joleaud v. Fortier, La Revue légale, nouvelle série vol. 37 (1931), pp. 210-213. The dangers associated 
with dusk or early evening from this perspective are well documented. Cournoyer found that most fatal 
accidents involving Montreal children occurred between 4:00 and 7:00 p.m.; see her “Les accidents 
impliquant des enfants,” p 89. Similarly, between October 1957 and September 1958, some 44% of the 324 
young pedestrians injured in car accidents and treated at the Montreal Children’s Hospital had been struck 
between 4:00 and 8:00 p.m. See Ruth McDougall, “Traffic Accidents to Children,” Canadian Medical 
Association Journal, vol. 82, no. 2 (January 9, 1960), p. 62. For the United States, see Zelizer, Pricing the 
Priceless Child, p. 50. 
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named Fortier. Jacqueline’s father sued the driver for the considerable sum of 
$15,000, including medical and funeral costs amounting to about $260, but also 
over $14,000 for “la perte des services de ladite Jacqueline Joleaud et l’assistance 
que ses parents pouvaient attendre d’elle.”19 While he confirmed Fortier’s fault in 
the accident and ruled in favour of the girl’s father, Judge Édouard Fabre Surveyer 
of Montreal’s Superior Court also reduced the award for loss of services very 
substantially, from over $14,000 to $250, making for a total award of $509. The 
judge’s logic reveals the strictly material terms in which the law framed these 
awards. The cash value of young Jacqueline’s potential service and assistance 
later in life was estimated at only $250, taking into account her father’s financial 
condition, his age, and the fact that the dead girl had two older sisters “qui peuvent 
rendre les mêmes services.”20 The father’s pecuniary loss was thus mitigated by 
the presence of further “assets” in his household, in the form of two surviving 
daughters. There is no mention in the decision of any form of compensation for 
moral, emotional, or psychological suffering on the part of Joleaud or his wife, 
which is to say that Solatium Doloris was a non-starter for this judge.
 As Reiter has shown, however, the tensions, ambivalence, and outright 
opposition to this strict pecuniary calculus do show up in Quebec courtrooms 
during this period.21 There are numerous references to the concept of “préjudice 
moral,” including several in which such arguments were accepted by the presiding 
judge. In a leading case heard on appeal before the Court of King’s Bench in 
Quebec City, a minimal award made by the lower court for damages in the death 
of a nine-year-old girl—a mere $136 for funeral expenses only, compared to the 
plaintiff’s claim for $5,000—was revised upwards to include a further $500 in 
damages. The judgement stated, in part, that the father of a child “qui a perdu 
la vie en conséquence d’un délit, a droit de réclamer de l’auteur du délit des 
dommages-intérêts pour le préjudice moral qu’il éprouve.”22 Similarly, Judge Weir 
of the Montreal Superior Court allowed $1,000 in damages for “moral prejudice” 
in a 1926 case involving a four-year-old girl who had been run over by a milk 
truck.23 Two decades later, the father of teenaged twins killed when their friend’s 
sailboat struck live power lines argued, in his suit against the Shawinigan Water 
and Power Company, not only that he had been wrongly deprived of substantial 
pecuniary benefits in the future—each boy being industrious, in good health, well 
educated, and assured of a brilliant career—but also that “cette mort lui a causé 
une perturbation dans sa vie par la perte des joies du foyer et de la part du bonheur 
qu’il attendait de ses enfants.”24 The argument was rejected by Judge Langlais 
of the Trois-Rivières Superior Court, convinced no doubt by defence counsel’s 
19 Joleaud v. Fortier , p. 212.
20 Ibid.
21 This was also the period in which American legislators and courts began both revising or re-interpreting the 
legal rules and making larger and larger awards; see Zelizer, Pricing the Priceless Child, pp. 153-155.
22 Hunter v. Gingras, Rapports judiciaires de Québec (Banc du Roi), vol. 33 (1922), pp. 403-420 (citation at 
p. 404, emphasis added). 
23 Chaussé v. J. J. Joubert et Compagnie, Limitée, Rapports judiciaires de Québec, vol. 65 (1927), pp. 144-
148.
24 Hackett v. The Shawinigan Water and Power Co., Rapports de pratique de Québec (1950), p. 191.
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contention that this was just a clever way of disguising the plaintiff’s plea to be 
compensated financially for his family’s grief. But it is interesting just the same.
 We might now shift our focus to April 28, 1956, when young Leonard 
Pearce, no longer a minor at 22 years of age, was struck by a car and killed 
while walking along Metropolitan Boulevard in Pointe-Claire.25 The driver fled 
the scene but was traced to his Verdun home by police, after an alert witness 
reported his licence plate number.26 The plaintiff in this case was the victim’s 
father, Harry Pearce, a 46-year-old railway foreman who lived in nearby Valois 
with his wife and three surviving children. Pearce sued the hit-and-run driver in 
a case heard in September 1958 before Judge Ignace Deslauriers of the Montreal 
Superior Court, for the rather extraordinary amount of $29,392.41. The bereaved 
father included some rarely seen items in his estimate ($1,392.41) of the direct 
expenses deriving from Leonard’s untimely death. Among them were the standard 
funeral and burial costs (totalling $555.80) but also the cost of cards, stamps, 
telegrams, transportation, a funeral dress for Mrs. Pearce, and a bronze plaque 
“élevé en pieux hommage à la mémoire du défunt.”27 Harry Pearce also sought 
specific amounts for Leonard’s room-and-board (the preceding six months at $3 
per day, payment of which he claimed to have been promised by his late son) 
and for the lawyers’ fees he had accumulated in the preparation of his suit for 
damages. Interestingly, Pearce and his lawyers made separate arguments as to 
compensation for himself and his wife. For himself, he claimed a total of $13,000, 
broken down as follows: $5,000 for “perte de soutien future”; $5,000 for “perte de 
réconfort, d’affection, de dévouement et d’assistance”; and $3,000 for “la douleur, 
la souffrance et l’inconvénient que la mort de son fils lui a occasionnés.”28 For 
his wife, Pearce claimed a further $15,000, including $10,000 for loss of future 
support, comfort, affection, devotion, and assistance, plus a full $5,000 for his 
wife’s pain, suffering, and inconvenience, the intensity of which (to judge from 
these amounts) was understood to be measurably greater than his own.29
 In his ruling, Judge Deslaurier did not award anything approaching the entire 
amount; among other things, he rejected Pearce’s application for the cost of the 
bronze plaque and the funeral dress. However, the court awarded $1,000 each to 
Mr. and Mrs. Pearce for the “préjudice certain subi par la perte d’un membre de 
leur famille”30—a decision that brought the total award up to $5,555, the largest 
single award among the 25 examined here. The judge’s language in framing his 
ruling is interesting and suggests considerably more flexibility in interpreting the 
law in this area than we saw in the case of Jacqueline Joleaud some 30 years 
earlier: “Les enfants n’existent pas simplement pour donner éventuellement 
quelques dollars à leurs vieux parents,” wrote the judge: 
25 Pearce v. Buckley, Rapports judiciaires de Québec (1960), pp. 145-154. 
26 “Six Persons Die in Weekend Accidents: Police Hold Verdunite in Hit-Run,” The Gazette, April 30, 1956, 
p. 3.
27 Pearce v. Buckley, p. 147.
28 Ibid., pp. 147-148.
29 Ibid., p. 148. “While the economically useful child was legally ‘owned’ by the father,” Zelizer reminds us, 
“the ‘priceless’ child is considered the mother’s sentimental asset” (Pricing the Priceless Child, p. 159).
30 Pearce v. Buckley, p. 153.
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Bien souvent, ceux-ci n’ont pas besoin de cette aide. L’avantage pour les parents 
d’avoir des enfants a, sur toute leur vie, une influence considérable. Pour le père, 
ils peuvent motiver l’ambition et l’ardeur au travail qui lui permettent de donner la 
pleine mesure de ses talents. Chez la mère, les mêmes réactions se manifestent sous 
des formes différentes [...] Même éloignés, l’existence des enfants a sur la vie des 
parents une influence bienfaisante indéniable. Quand les enfants et les petits-enfants 
sont là, il est moins difficile pour les parents de vieillir.31
In the end, however, while the principles and awards debated by lawyers and 
decided by judges in suits for the wrongful death of children are illustrative, the 
extent to which such cases demonstrate shifts in the ways in which Quebec men 
understood and performed their role as fathers is less apparent. Certainly, there 
are hints here of a significant disconnect between a cultural and social climate 
that would acknowledge the moral and emotional suffering attendant upon the 
accidental death of a child and a legal system that continued to allow compensation 
for pecuniary losses only. There was a growing discomfort, too, with the perverse 
fact that negligent drivers who caused accidents that killed innocent young people 
had much less to lose, as far as legal damages were concerned, than those who, by 
similar careless acts, caused disfigurement or permanent disability. This growing 
tension, while interesting, may not mean that parents in general and fathers in 
particular were making greater emotional investments in their children, however. 
A better vantage point might be the converse situation, in which fathers were sued 
for monetary damages related to moral and physical injuries, up to and including 
fatalities, caused by their minor children—as opposed to those suffered by them. 
Dads as Defendants: In Search of the Manly Modern
Among the 59 civil suits selected for this study, 37 involved fathers as defendants: 
men who faced legal action stemming from the harmful behaviour of their children.32 
It must be noted immediately that all of these lawsuits involved transgressions 
committed by boys and young men; not a single girl or young woman, in other 
words, appears among the 37 minors whose harmful acts led to the legal action 
documented here.33 If nothing else, then, these cases offer a window onto the wide 
range of risk-taking activities engaged in by male youth in this period. Included 
here, for example, are an 11-year milkman’s son who knocked over a pedestrian 
while riding his sled down a steep, icy street in Black Lake;34 several boys who 
ran into people with their bicycles, including one to be described in more detail 
31 Pearce v. Buckley, p. 150.
32 Two of these cases were also included in the previous section, since they featured both a bereaved father 
acting as plaintiff and another father, the defendant, whose child had caused a fatal injury. They are Juneau 
v. Paquette, Rapports judiciaires de Québec (Cour Supérieure), vol. 61 (1923), pp. 539-541, and Aubry 
v.  Savard, Rapports judiciares de Québec, vol. 75 (1937), pp. 548-556. 
33 While this imbalance is striking, it seems likely that a larger collection of similar suits would yield a 
proportion of female “offenders” more closely in line with their level of representation, for instance, in 
the juvenile justice system, which ranged between 9% and 19% in Montreal between 1914 and 1945. See 
Tamara Myers, Caught: Montreal’s Modern Girls and the Law, 1869-1945 (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2006), Table 5.1, p. 138. 
34 Vallée v. La Corporation de la Ville de Black Lake, La Revue de jurisprudence, vol. 35 (1929), pp. 11-20.
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below;35 and boys causing accidents while playing with inflammable or explosive 
materials, including gasoline and blasting caps.36 There is a rather bizarre case 
from the 1940s of a youth giving his father a ride in a borrowed aéroglisseur—a 
primitive, propeller-driven snowmobile—when they collided with a man driving 
a horse and wagon; the unshielded propeller shredded the man’s arm, resulting 
in a permanent disability.37 There are even several cases of accidental shootings 
caused by boys who had access either to pellet guns or to real firearms, such as a 
revolver or a hunting rifle.38 Finally, once again, there are all of those accidents, 
many of them fatal, caused by reckless, imprudent, or unfortunate youths while 
operating the machine that came to symbolize both modernity and masculinity in 
the twentieth century: the automobile.
 Most of these cases turned specifically on the court’s application of article 
1054 of the Quebec Civil Code, which placed the burden squarely on the shoulders 
of a father whose minor child committed acts causing injury to someone else. The 
relevant passage, unchanged from 1866 to 1977, reads as follows: “The father, 
or, after his decease, the mother, is responsible for the damage caused by their 
minor children; [...] The responsibility attaches in the above cases only when the 
person subject to it fails to establish that he was unable to prevent the act which 
caused the damage.”39 Fathers, in other words, were legally responsible for their 
children’s harmful acts unless they could prove in court that nothing they might 
have done could have prevented those acts.
 Critically for present purposes, these cases therefore provide an opportunity 
to examine the expectations placed by society and the law on the father-
son relationship as a privileged space for the teaching and learning of manly 
behaviours and identity. They illustrate the expectations placed on fathers—by 
society, through the courts—in providing a masculine moral compass for their 
sons, through proper education, through appropriate supervision, and by setting 
the right kind of example. In particular, I will suggest, fathers were expected to 
transmit to their sons that emerging bundle of traits and characteristics, many 
of them wrapped up in twentieth-century conceptions of active risk-taking and 
responsible risk-management, that Christopher Dummitt—studying postwar 
Vancouver—calls the Manly Modern. Dummitt’s chapter on automobile safety 
is especially relevant here, given the number of car accidents in this collection. 
Safe driving, he suggests, was increasingly framed as “a kind of masculine 
achievement” that reflected modern, manly qualities such as a disciplined 
character, diligent awareness, foresight, and responsible behaviour. These must 
surely be counted among the key qualities that modern fathers were expected to 
35 Myre, Appelant v. White, Intimé, Rapports judiciaires de Québec, vol. 72 (1934), pp. 557-562.
36 Martin, ès-qual. v. Greenberg, Rapports judiciaires de Québec, vol. 71 (1933), pp. 350-355; Cutnam v. 
Léveillé, La Revue légale, nouvelle série vol. 37 (1931), pp. 84-99. 
37 Toutant v. Bossé et autres, Rapports judiciaires de Québec (1942), pp. 439-443. 
38 Pépin v. Petit, Rapports judiciaires de Québec (1949), pp. 255-256; Leipinaitis v. Martin et A. Leipinaitis, 
demandeur par reprise d’instance, Rapports judiciaires de Québec, vol. 69 (1931), pp. 459-461; Tardif, 
ès-qualité v. Paquette et un autre, Rapports judiciares de Québec, vol. 74 (1936), pp. 482-484. 
39 Paul-André Crépeau and John E. C. Brierley, eds., Code civil—Civil code, 1866-1980. Édition historique 
et critique—An Historical and Critical Edition (Montreal: Chambre des notaires du Québec—Société 
québécoise d’information juridique, 1981), p. 370. 
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instil in their adolescent sons, whether at the wheel or in other settings, both by 
setting a good example and through active efforts at education.40
 The number of relevant cases described in Quebec’s law reports increased 
noticeably in the interwar period, peaking in the 1930s; just over half (19 of 37) 
date from the years between 1930 and 1939. The case of 15-year-old Montrealer 
René Myre is typical.41 René had been cycling on Turgeon Street in the early 
evening of May 13, 1933, when he struck and seriously injured a 12-year-old 
girl, whom he seems to have been deliberately chasing. René’s father was the 
defendant in a lawsuit heard in Montreal’s Superior Court in 1934. In his ruling, 
Judge De Lorimier ordered the elder Myre to pay more than $2,000 to the father 
of the injured girl—a ruling that was confirmed on appeal to the Court of King’s 
Bench. Clearly Myre had not met his burden of proof under Article 1054: he had 
failed to convince the court that there was nothing he might have done to prevent 
the accident. The opinion of Judge St-Jacques, who sat on the panel that upheld 
this judgement on appeal, is worth citing. The boy’s father argued that he had 
provided young René and his 12 siblings with the best of everything, including 
education and material goods, such as the fateful bicycle. While this generosity 
certainly established that Myre had a comfortable income, 
[...] il n’en résulte pas nécessairement qu’il ait donné à René une éducation soignée 
et qu’il l’ait particulièrement instruit sur la façon de conduire une bicyclette, qu’il 
lui ait recommandé, par exemple, de ne pas poursuivre les petites filles, soit pour 
leur faire peur soit pour leur causer des ennuis. Le père qui achète une bicyclette 
pour son fils de quatorze ou quinze ans, lui permet de s’en servir dans les rues 
d’une cité populeuse comme celle de Montréal, ne commet pas nécessairement une 
grande imprudence. Mais il prend, tout de même, le risque que son enfant puisse se 
causer à lui-même et causer à d’autres des dommages par la conduite imprudente 
ou maladroite de ce véhicule.42
This ruling and others like it beg the question as to what sorts of circumstances 
and arguments might allow fathers to meet their burden of proof under article 
1054. Two more cases from the 1930s provide some hints. In Asselin v. Jarry, 
from 1933, a prosperous automobile dealer, Odessa Jarry, was sued for $35,000 
after his son had killed two people in a late-night collision: a criminal act for 
which the youth, who had been drinking, was charged with manslaughter and 
convicted of criminal negligence.43 The jury in this case concluded that the young 
driver, who had had two previous accidents, should not have been trusted behind 
40 Christopher Dummitt, The Manly Modern: Masculinity in Postwar Canada (Vancouver: University of 
British Columbia Press, 2007), especially chap. 6, “On the Road,” pp. 125-149 (citation at p.127). Cotten 
Seiler’s Republic of Drivers: A Cultural History of Automobility in America (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2008) contains similarly rich insights into the gendered dynamics of driving: a modern, 
masculine activity that added a new dimension to the established trope of “rugged individualism.” See 
especially pp. 85-89.
41 Myre v. White.
42 Ibid., p. 560.
43 Dame Alice Asselin v. Odessa Jarry, et al., La Revue de jurisprudence 40 (1934): 478-93; “Amireault 
Widow will Claim $50,000,” The Gazette, March 11, 1933, p. 6; “Jarry Case Ruling Reversed in Part,” The 
Gazette, November 7, 1933, p. 3.
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the wheel and that his father ought to have foreseen the tragedy. Judge Wilson of 
Montreal Superior Court overruled this verdict, however, maintaining that Jarry 
senior had met his burden of proof, in part by denying any knowledge that his 
son had a fondness for liquor or late-night joy rides. “Le père de famille,” he 
decided, “n’est pas responsable d’un accident qui a pu être causé par son fils, s’il 
prouve qu’il a donné à celui-ci la meilleure éducation possible, qu’il n’était pas 
à la connaissance du père que le fils faisait usage de boissons enivrantes, que lui 
le père, ne pouvait raisonnablement prévoir ce malheur, qu’il n’était pas present 
dans la voiture au moment où 1’accident s’est produit, et qu’il n’a pu empêcher 
le fait qui a causé le dommage.”44 Still in the 1930s in a much different setting—a 
hunting excursion—a father was sued for damages after his son accidentally 
shot and injured a fellow hunter.45 The father, Narcisse Paquette, was not held 
responsible under article 1054, primarily because his son, Gaston-Léopold, had 
almost reached the age of majority at the time of the accident. Here, the judge 
ruled that in these circumstances, “la victime ne peut exercer un recours contre 
le père du délinquant, s’il résulte de l’enquête que le fils du défendeur avait reçu 
une bonne éducation, s’était toujours conduit d’une façon exemplaire et qu’il avait 
alors atteint un âge où dans son milieu social on laisse aux jeunes gens une grande 
liberté d’action.”46 The son himself, having reached the age of 21 by the time the 
trial was heard, was ordered in this case to pay damages in the amount of $300.
 Overall, about one-third of the fathers in this collection of cases (13 of 37) 
made successful exculpatory arguments, convincing judges across Quebec that 
there was nothing they might have done differently, in educating or supervising 
their sons, to prevent the harmful behaviour for which damages were claimed. 
Generally speaking, in cases in which boys were understood to have been engaged 
in play—even aggressive and risky forms of play, such as throwing stones and 
playing with matches—fathers stood a greater chance of meeting their burden 
of proof than in other circumstances. In Martin v. Greenberg, the defendant was 
a Montreal grocer whose son Edward (14) had taken a can of gasoline from 
the store to clean his bicycle; his younger son Solly (9) took a box of matches. 
Ultimately, the gas can went up in flames and the plaintiff’s son, Cecil Martin, 
was badly burned. The ruling from Judge Robert Greenshields of Montreal 
Superior Court was that the fault lay with the younger son, Solly Greenberg, who 
had taken the matches and kicked the can over while fleeing the scene. However, 
“The presumption of fault imposed upon the father of a minor son by article 1054 
C.C., is rebutted, if the father establishes that he did everything in the way of 
education, both religious and secular that a father could do and gave every care 
to the proper upbringing of his minor child and affirmatively proves that he was 
in no way at fault.”47 In this case, once again, a jury’s verdict against the boys’ 
father was set aside, and Greenshields dismissed the action against the grocer non 
obstante veredicto (notwithstanding the verdict) based on the boy’s overall good 
44 Asselin v. Jarry et al,, pp. 478-479.
45 Tardif, ès-qualité v. Paquette, et un autre.
46 Ibid., p. 482
47 Martin, ès-qual. v. Greenberg, Rapports judiciaires de Québec, vol. 71 (1933), p. 350.
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character and his father’s attention to his secular and religious instruction. Ruling 
on a 1950s case involving risky play in the streets of Montreal—a boy had struck a 
pebble (caillou) with a baseball bat, breaking a car window and seriously injuring 
the driver—Judge Gérard Trudel made similar arguments in somewhat more 
philosophical terms, influenced perhaps by the developmental psychology of the 
day: “L’automatisme de la responsabilité est [...] inconcevable dans les relations 
de père à fils. L’enfant, même mineur, garde son tempérament, son caractère, et 
les qualités et défauts que la nature lui a donnés, sans que les parents y soient 
pour rien. C’est ainsi que se forme la personnalité et la liberté de l’homme. La 
personnalité et la liberté du mineur ne peuvent donc exister et engager en même 
temps la responsabilité absolue du père.”48
 The majority of cases in this collection, however, involved boys and young 
men who were judged to have indeed crossed the line between a masculine norm 
of rough, aggressive, sometimes risky play and dangerous, undisciplined, or even 
criminal behaviour that, in the court’s opinion, a prudent father ought to have 
prevented through better education and supervision. When young Edna Carty, 
for instance, was blinded in one eye by a stone propelled from the slingshot of 
13-year-old John Morkill, the judge found the boy’s father responsible because he 
had never forbidden his son from using the device or even reprimanded him for it. 
Parents must do more, ruled the judge, than provide their children with a good moral 
and religious education: “ils doivent aussi les empêcher d’acquérir des habitudes, 
ou de se servir de choses pouvant causer des dommages à autrui; autrement ils 
doivent être tenus responsables des dommages causés par ces habitudes ou ces 
choses.”49 Similar rulings were made in two 1930s cases in which boys aged 13 
and 11 shot other children with rifles, in one case perforating a boy’s bladder and 
in the other killing a four-year-old girl.50 In Cutnam v. Leveillé, the foreman of 
a dredging crew was held responsible after failing to prevent his son (17) and a 
younger boy (12) from playing with some nitro-glycerine blasting caps that he had 
stored in an unlocked shed near his home, resulting in an explosion that cost the 
younger boy several fingers of his left hand. This is one of the clearest cases of 
paternal negligence in this collection, with the careless foreman’s responsibility a 
foregone conclusion and the only issue at trial being the amount of compensation 
to be awarded.51
 Just as interesting, if perhaps more difficult for the courts to assess, are several 
cases in which fathers were sued for acts committed by their sons that resulted in 
other kinds of injuries, namely to honour, reputation, and property. In two cases 
here, for instance, men were sued for moral damages and lying-in expenses after 
48 Pruneau v. Mianney, Rapports judiciaires de Québec (1956), p. 350.
49 Robert Carty v. The Board of Protestant School Commissioners of the City of Sherbrooke and John T. 
Morkill, La Revue de jurisprudence, vol. 32 (1926), p. 157
50 Gosselin v. Dalpé, La Revue légale, vol. 43 (1937), pp. 163-167; Aubry v. Savard, Rapports judiciares de 
Québec, vol. 75 (1937), pp. 548-556. In the latter case, the boy in question was given unfettered access to a 
hunting rifle by his uncle, with whom he lived in the Saguenay region and to whom paternal responsibilities 
were held to attach, despite the fact that his actual father was still living and visited on occasion.
51 Cutnam vs Léveillé, La Revue légale, nouvelle série vol. 37 (1931), pp. 84-99. 
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their minor sons had become involved in sexual liaisons leading to pregnancy.52 
There are two further cases in which fathers were sued because their sons had 
directed verbal attacks and other moral injuries at third parties. One plaintiff was 
a pool-room operator who was subjected to drunken insults when he tried to eject 
young Jean-Louis Cantin from the restaurant attached to his establishment. The 
court found for the plaintiff and ruled, essentially, that Cantin (père) should have 
set a better example, especially in the area of alcohol consumption, in a judgement 
that included the phrase “Tel père, tel fils.”53
 In circumstances in which the minor’s transgression rose to the level of a 
criminal act, moreover, judges were particularly disinclined to entertain exculpatory 
arguments. In one case, heard in the Superior Court for the Richelieu District in 
1950, a 20-year-old youth who had stolen $230 was described from the bench as 
an incorrigible delinquent who had been in and out of reform school since the age 
of nine. In his ruling for the plaintiff, Judge Charles-Auguste Bertrand essentially 
accused the boy’s father of lax parenting. In cases like this, argued Bertrand, a 
laisser-faire attitude combined with the occasional verbal reproach will have no 
effect: “plus l’enfant affiche des penchants répréhensibles, plus la sévérité du 
père doit s’exercer, par des répressions au besoin cuisantes, à lui inspirer une 
crainte salutaire.”54 In another case from the 1950s, Alcide Pelland was sued for 
damages after his 16-year-old son Robert “borrowed” his car and, along with three 
friends, robbed a jewelry store of $12,000 in merchandise. Although the Joliette 
Superior Court initially dismissed the action, the decision was reversed on appeal 
to Montreal’s Court of King’s Bench. According to the four judges, Alcide Pelland 
could have prevented the jewel heist by offering young Robert a good education 
and proper supervision. In particular, Pelland was reproached for having raised 
young Robert in an unsavoury rooming house, for having supported his son from 
the proceeds of illegal liquor sales, and for having taught him “le mépris de la loi 
et du serment” by encouraging him to lie to authorities in order to obtain a driver’s 
licence at age 16.55
 Of all the cases in which fathers were sued for damages related to their sons’ 
transgressions, the largest plurality (15 of the 37) involved youthful operators 
of automobiles and other motorized vehicles.56 Ten of these fathers were found 
responsible and ordered to pay damages ranging from a few hundred dollars for 
the repair of a car to tens of thousands for serious injuries resulting in permanent 
disabilities. To what extent do these cases in particular support Dummitt’s 
argument—made for postwar Vancouver but surely more widely applicable—
that contemporary understandings of the modern, responsible manhood and of 
the modern, responsible driver closely mirrored each other? What kind of safe-
driving rhetoric emerges from these Quebec cases, which are predominantly from 
the interwar period but which also extend into the 1950s? And if “the process 
52 A v. L., Rapports judiciaires de Québec, vol. 70 (1932), pp. 127-128; A. v. A., Rapports judiciaires de 
Québec (1945), pp. 545-553.
53 Labonté v. Cantin, Rapports judiciaires de Québec, vol. 70 (1932), p.116
54 V. v. M., Rapports judiciaires de Québec (1950), p. 380
55 Dénommé v. Pelland, Rapports judiciaires de Québec (1960), pp. 421-422.
56 Specifically, three trucks and one propeller-driven snowmobile (aéroglisseur).
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of becoming a safe driver closely resembled the process of becoming a modern 
man,”57 to what extent were fathers—in their “modernized” role as educators and 
role models—understood to be responsible, at some level, for guiding their sons 
through both of these processes, and thus legally accountable when they failed?58
 When minor sons got behind the wheel and caused injury to the person 
or property of others, their fathers were legally responsible by default. In their 
attempts to absolve themselves of this burden—and especially of the financial 
liability that went with it—these men made similar arguments about education, 
supervision, and responsibility to those we have already seen. In the case of 
automobile accidents, however, it was also necessary to make another set of 
arguments, offering evidence of the youth’s experience and competence as a 
driver. After an 18-year-old youth, driving his father’s car, collided with another 
vehicle on King Street in Sherbrooke in July 1930, for instance, the other driver 
sued for damages resulting from the accident. In this case, the plaintiff maintained 
firstly that the collision was the young man’s fault and secondly that the defendant, 
Hébert, was doubly responsible: as the boy’s father, under article 1054, and under 
Section 53, paragraph 2 of Quebec’s Motor Vehicles Act (1924) as the owner 
of the vehicle that had caused the damage.59 To establish that there was nothing 
he might have done to prevent the accident, Hébert argued not only that he had 
provided his son with a good education and appropriate supervision, but that his 
son was an experienced driver with a good safety record and the holder of a valid 
driver’s licence issued by the provincial government. For Justice White of the 
Superior Court, St. Francis District, this argument was “sufficient to establish 
that the father was unable to prevent the act which caused the damage.” Indeed, 
continued the judge, “it would seem that the only way in which he could have 
‘prevented the act which caused the damage’ would be that he would not have 
permitted his son to drive the car, but the defendant’s son had a license to drive a 
car, which license had been properly issued, by the Government of the Province. 
He was accustomed to drive a car and had never previously had an accident.”60
 In a string of cases from the 1950s, several fathers made successful exculpatory 
arguments under article 1054. While the details vary, the defendants generally 
stuck to a standard script, framing their unfortunate sons as competent, experienced 
drivers who had been given a sound education and never previously shown the 
kinds of tendencies that might predictably lead them down such a dangerous road. 
More frequently, however, the default position in the Civil Code—that fathers 
were responsible for damages caused by their minor children—was held to apply. 
Outcomes depended somewhat on the judge’s discretion and on his assessment 
of the circumstances and the character of the parties in question. In 1933, Judge 
57 Dummitt, The Manly Modern, p. 24.
58 For the international literature on the “new” fatherhood in this period, see the references in note 1, especially 
Griswold, Fatherhood in America and LaRossa, The Modernization of Fatherhood. The relevant Quebec 
literature is summarized in Gossage, “Au nom du père?” but see in particular Duhaime, La construction du 
père québécois and “‘Les pères ont ici leur devoir’”; Roy, “L’Évolution de la figure paternelle.”
59 Quebec Statutes 14 George V (1924), Loi concernant les véhicules automobiles, section 53, paragraph 2, 
p. 115.
60 Hébert v. Fabi, La Revue légale, nouvelle série vol. 39 (1933), p. 209.
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Surveyer of the Montreal Superior Court, ruled against the father of 18-year-old 
Armand Ross, who had sped recklessly through a red light in Ville-Émard with 
at least four passengers in his Pontiac. These included his parents—whom he 
was apparently trying to frighten by driving so fast—and a girl named Jeanne 
Dansereau, who was injured when the car collided with another vehicle. Although 
Armand Ross was a licensed driver and although in this instance he was being 
directly supervised, albeit to no great effect, by his father, Surveyer ruled that Ross 
(père) could have prevented the collision had he refused to allow his son to buy 
the car or apply for his licence, knowing as he did that the youth was “un chauffeur 
incompétent, imprudent et amateur de vitesse.”61 Speeding was a factor in many 
of these collisions, and drivers like Arthur Côté, who in 1930 hit another car while 
driving his father’s truck at a speed of 25 or 30 miles per hour (he admitted to 
26, whereas the speed limit for trucks was 15) could expect little mercy from the 
bench. This was especially true if the purpose of the fateful journey was sheer 
amusement, as in this case: the accident occurred on a September evening at 8:40 
p.m. with “quatre jeunes filles” along for the ride in Côté’s truck.62
 Vigilant fathers might certainly have had difficulty predicting whether their 
sons might be prone to risky driving at high speeds, so judges had some discretion 
here. In cases in which young men involved in car accidents were found to have 
been driving without a valid licence, however, they had much less latitude. In a 
1956 decision, Judge William Morin of the Superior Court, Arthabaska District, 
seems to have been inclined to rule for the defendant, a farmer named Bolduc 
whose testimony Morin described as that of “un père de famille qui s’occupe 
de ses enfants.” The offending youth was described as a hardworking lad who 
had the skill and experience required to manage the family farm in his father’s 
absence each winter, a responsibility that implied “un travail incessant et de 
nombreux problèmes d’administration.” Morin states in his ruling that he would 
have preferred to absolve Bolduc (père) of any responsibility for the accident, 
which occurred because both his son and the other driver had been driving too 
close to the centre of a recently gravelled road, rather than on the right as required 
by law. The problem for the younger Bolduc, and indeed for his father, was that he 
had been driving without a licence when the accident occurred. This was no small 
matter, and it left the judge with no choice other than to rule, reluctantly, that the 
father might have prevented the accident by insisting that his son obey the law and 
refrain from driving without a valid permit.63
 Although the stakes were much higher—there were no injuries in the Bolduc 
collision and the total amount of damages awarded was only $151—the issues 
were quite similar in a case heard by Judge Hector Perrier of Montreal Superior 
Court just one year later, in 1957. This near head-on collision was caused by 
61 Dansereau v. Ross, La Revue légale, nouvelle série vol. 39 (1933), p. 194; see also La Revue de 
jurisprudence, vol. 39 (1933), pp. 282-288.
62 Lemieux v. Côté, La Revue de jurisprudence, vol. 37 (1931), pp. 307-312 (quotation at p. 308).
63 Fournier v. Bolduc, Rapports judiciaires de Québec (1956), pp. 226-228 (quotation at p. 228). In part, the 
ruling reads as follows: “[D]ans le cas où le père permet à son fils mineur de commettre un acte défendu 
par la loi, la responsabilité du père quant aux délits ou quasi-délits commis par son fils mineur est alors 
engagée.”
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Pierre Perras, aged only 16, who while driving a heavily loaded truck on a rural 
highway near Laprairie had attempted to pass a slow-moving tractor on a blind 
curve, forcing an oncoming car driven by the plaintiff—a commercial traveller 
named Glencross, on the road for General Electric—into the ditch. The badly 
injured victim was rushed to the Montreal General Hospital where he survived 
several surgeries to emerge with a partial but permanent disability estimated at 
50 per cent. The damages ultimately awarded were very substantial ($50,331, 
reduced from an initial claim of $74,514) but covered in part ($11,774) by La 
Commission des Accidents du Travail (Workmen’s Compensation Board). More 
interesting for us is the discussion as to whether Pierre’s parents, Paul Perras and 
Éva Charrest, should be held accountable for their son’s tragic error. The couple 
were separate as to property, and Éva was both the legal owner of the truck in 
question and Paul’s de facto partner in the construction business for which their 
son worked; as a result both were named as defendants in this case, which is 
unusual in this collection. The defence strategy was to argue that young Paul 
had received a good education, that he was a skilled driver, and that the terrible 
accident could not therefore have been foreseen or prevented.64
 Judge Perrier did not accept these arguments. In particular, he was astonished 
by the evidence advanced by Pierre’s parents to support the claim that their son was 
a skilled driver: “la preuve,” he writes, “révèle le fait étonnant qu’il a commencé 
à conduire le camion de ses parents à l’âge de six ans.” Perrier then made a 
careful distinction between skill (habilité) and competence: “Il est probable que 
le défendeur Pierre Perras ait eu assez d’habilité pour conduire ce camion, mais 
avait-il la compétence requise par le législateur?” The provincial government, 
after all, had set 17 years (reduced from 18 in 1943) as the age at which young 
Quebecers could be trusted behind the wheel. “Le législateur,” mused Perrier in 
his ruling, “a-t-il pensé qu’en bas de cet âge, un jeune peut ne pas posséder assez 
d’esprit de concentration pour parer à tous les risques et dangers de la circulation, 
ou encore qu’il se laisse aller à la témérité et à la frénésie de la vitesse?” Like the 
Bolduc boy, Pierre Perras did not possess a valid driver’s licence at the time of the 
accident. Although he did have a licence, he had obtained it fraudulently by lying 
under oath about his age (he was 16), a lie compounded in these circumstances by 
his father’s complicity and disregard for the law in counter-signing the application. 
“Le législateur,” continued the judge, “a-t-il prévu qu’un jeune garçon pourrait, 
plus facilement qu’un homme d’âge mûr, commettre des imprudences aussi graves 
que celle qui a été commise par le défendeur Pierre Perras?” In violating so openly 
and obviously the terms of the Motor Vehicles Act in allowing their 16-year-
old son to drive a heavily loaded truck in the furtherance of their construction 
business, the boy’s father and mother “ont commis une faute et ne peuvent pas 
prétender qu’ils ont pris tous les moyens possibles pour empêcher l’accident dont 
leur fils a été la cause.”65
 One final case, while it turned less on article 1054 of the Civil Code, 
nonetheless reveals much about the burden the law placed on fathers for the 
64 Glencross v. Dame Charrest et autres, Rapports judiciaires de Québec (1958), pp. 600-605.
65 Ibid. (all quotations at p. 604).
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education and supervision of their children, especially their male children, and 
especially the terms under which Quebec fathers might be held accountable for 
their sons’ mistakes. Stemming from a hit-and-run accident, this suit for damages 
went all the way to the Supreme Court and was reported in at least one Montreal 
newspaper.66 On Dominion Day in 1950, Richard Foley Jr., aged 18, spent the 
evening in the garage of his father’s house in Montreal, drinking beer with a group 
of friends to celebrate the return of his brother from a trip to Africa. His father, 
Richard Foley Sr., went to bed at about 11:00 p.m., taking the keys to his car into 
the bedroom with him. Sometime after that, without waking up his Dad to ask 
permission or borrow the keys, Richard Jr. took the car—which he started by hot-
wiring the ignition—and drove with two of his friends to Iberville, near St-Jean-
sur-Richelieu, to visit a third. The next morning, the group went to a local hotel 
or tavern where they resumed their drinking spree until about 11:30 a.m. Soon 
after their departure, on the road between Iberville and Farnham, the car driven 
by Richard Foley Jr. struck a young girl, Yvette Marcoux, who was riding her 
bicycle and who was seriously injured. Richard Jr. and his friends left the scene, 
without offering any assistance to the victim. They abandoned the car in Iberville 
and returned to Montreal, each on his own, apparently. Guilty of a hit-and-run 
collision causing serious injuries while under the influence of alcohol, Richard Jr. 
stayed on the south shore a little longer than the others, then returned to Montreal 
where he hid under a tent, in a vain attempt to avoid arrest. 
 Richard Foley Jr. almost certainly faced criminal charges for negligence, 
drunk driving, and fleeing the scene of an accident, although I have only found 
one brief mention of his apprehension by the police. Meanwhile in Superior Court, 
Yvette’s father, Ovila Marcoux, sued Richard Foley Sr., both personally and in his 
capacity as tutor to his minor son, for damages in the amount of $75,000. Yvette 
Marcoux’s injuries are described in the report only as “serious” (graves) but 
one suspects, from the size of the claim, that they must have required extensive 
medical care and resulted in a permanent disability. As we have seen, no claim of 
this size—and the irony was not lost on many jurists at the time—could have been 
contemplated had the Marcoux’s “priceless child” been killed in this accident. 
Ultimately, Judge Charles-Édouard Ferland found for the plaintiff in Superior 
Court, awarding $26,843.81 in damages, a ruling that was upheld on appeal by a 
majority ruling from the Court of Queen’s Bench for the District of Montreal and, 
ultimately, by the Supreme Court of Canada. Article 1054 did not apply in this 
case because it was not specifically cited in the plaintiff’s initial declaration, as 
it certainly might have been. So the courts ruled instead on the basis of the much 
more general article 1053: “Every person capable of discerning right from wrong 
is responsible for the damage caused by his fault to another, whether by positive 
act, imprudence, neglect or want of skill.”67 The ruling against Foley Sr., then, 
was based on his own negligence and imprudence in taking insufficient measures 
to ensure that his car was not operated by a potentially reckless or imprudent 
66 Supreme Court of Canada, Foley v. Marcoux, (1957) SCR 650, October 1, 1957; “$28,600 Question: Is 
Father Responsible if Keys Withheld,” The Gazette, May 28, 1957, p. 17.
67 Crépeau and Brierley, eds., Code Civil/Civil Code, p. 369.
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driver.68 Foley knew or should have known that beer was being consumed in his 
garage the night before the accident. Instead of exercising the necessary vigilance, 
he went to bed and left these boys to their own devices. His one precaution was 
to keep the car keys with him, but he must have known that young Richard knew 
how to hot-wire the car—because his son had apparently done so in the past. He 
had therefore committed a serious error of omission and was condemned by the 
Supreme Court to suffer all of the consequences prescribed by the law, namely 
an award for damages in excess of $25,000. In the final judgement, written by 
Justice Taschereau with Justice Rand dissenting, it was decided that Foley Sr. 
“n’a pas exercé la surveillance voulue dans le choix du conducteur. Il n’est pas 
suffisant pour se disculper de la responsabilité civile, de donner des instructions, 
mais encore faut-il voir à ce que ces instructions soient observées.”69
 Although article 1054 with its specific invocation of paternal responsibility 
for a child’s misdeeds was not applied in this case, I think the issues for the study 
of fatherhood are no less clear and compelling. Could Richard Foley Sr. have 
prevented the bad acts that caused the damage inflicted by Richard Jr. on little 
Yvette and her family, represented here by her father and tutor Ovila Marcoux? 
Could he simply have locked the car door to prevent his son from slipping in and 
hot-wiring it? Should he have stayed up a bit later or at least issued a stern warning 
about not taking the car before going bed? Might he have provided his son with 
tighter and more consistent supervision, rather than the “kindly tolerance” that, 
as was argued in court, characterized his parenting style? Might he have offered 
Richard Jr. a better education, particularly in the area of road safety and the dangers 
of drinking and driving? Is there even, perhaps, a sense in which Foley Sr. was on 
trial for his failure to provide his son with adequate notions of civic responsibility? 
A hit-and-run driver, plainly, is the antithesis of a responsible citizen who can be 
relied on to own up to his transgressions and offer help to people in need. The fact 
that responsible citizenship in this era was coded male certainly bears repeating. 
As Dummitt points out, hit-and-run drivers were among those most readily tarred 
by safety experts and others “with characteristics considered to be unmanly.”70 
Real men, after all, don’t injure little girls then run and hide under tents to avoid 
the consequences. 
Conclusion
We can return in conclusion to Zelizer’s Priceless Child and Dummitt’s Manly 
Modern. It would be difficult to contemplate a Quebec version of Zelizer’s careful 
reconstruction of the material value placed on the lives of children, especially 
by insurance companies and in suits for wrongful death, in twentieth-century 
America. Peter Baskerville’s recent essay on Canadians and especially Quebecers 
68 The terms of the Supreme Court ruling were, in part, as follows: “When in an action against father for 
damages caused by his minor son while driving his father’s car with permission there is no allegation of 
the minority of the son and it is admitted that the son was not the préposé of his father, the latter cannot be 
held responsible under art 1054 CC. But his responsibility will be engaged under art 1053 CC if it is proved 
that he was negligent in permitting his son to take his car” (Foley v. Marcoux, p. 650).
69 Foley v. Marcoux, p. 654. See also the Gazette article on this ruling, cited in note 82.
70 Dummitt, The Manly Modern, p. 140.
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who took out life insurance on their children, based on census microdata for 1911, 
provides one piece of a complex puzzle; but there is much more to be done.71 Still, 
Zelizer’s ideas provide a framework for understanding the sorts of calculations 
and negotiations that were present in civil suits in which bereaved parents sought 
some kind of compensation for the tragic loss of a child. Certainly, the logic 
whereby children could be counted as economic assets was receding, in Quebec 
as elsewhere, as studies of fertility have shown and as the interesting 1940s debate 
over family allowances demonstrates nicely.72 At the same time, pressure for a 
new form of legal compensation that could acknowledge the moral and emotional 
suffering attendant upon the loss of an increasingly priceless child does seem to 
have been growing, over a period of four decades which saw similar trends in the 
United States, especially as the case for such compensation might be strengthened 
with reference to French legal traditions.
 At first brush, such considerations seem to provide further evidence for the 
modernization of Quebec fatherhood as the twentieth century progressed. By all 
accounts, this process would have involved the reinforcement of emotional ties 
between fathers and their children, as families became more democratic and as 
the paternal role grew less authoritarian and more nurturing. Catherine Cournoyer, 
along these lines, has observed a growing trend for fathers to express their grief, 
anguish, and indignation publicly following the death of a beloved child, leading 
her to speculate about an emerging space for fathers in which “certaines vertus 
masculines tels le stoïcisme et la dureté se [seraient] érodés au profit d’une plus 
grande liberté d’expression émotionnelle.”73 Duhaime has shown that while there 
was resistance to such changes from within the Catholic families movement, 
that they were nonetheless underway, although perhaps on a different timetable 
from other parts of North America.74 While the growing tension around Solatium 
Doloris is fascinating, however, it does not necessarily reveal very much about 
the changing culture, ideology, and sentimental content of fatherhood in Quebec. 
Fathers certainly seem to have been asking the courts more frequently to award 
compensation, and in larger amounts, for the grief they suffered upon the loss of 
a child. Was that because they had been investing more emotional capital in their 
increasingly precious children, and therefore feeling the pain of such an unthinkable 
loss more intensely? Perhaps. But one might just as reasonably assume that they 
did so primarily as the legal heads and representatives of their families, rather 
than in their own names as injured male individuals seeking compensation for a 
tragic personal loss. Unless they were widows, after all, bereaved mothers had no 
independent legal recourse in such circumstances prior to 1964. And a grieving 
71 Peter Baskerville, “The Worth of Children and Women: Life Insurance in Early Twentieth-Century 
Canada” in Gordon Darroch, ed., The Dawn of Canada’s Century: Hidden Histories (Montreal and 
Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2014), pp. 452-480. 
72 Danielle Gauvreau, Diane Gervais, and Peter Gossage, La Fécondité des Québécoises, 1870-1970. D’une 
exception à l’autre (Montreal: Les Éditions du Boréal, 2007); Marshall, The Social Origins of the Welfare 
State.
73 Cournoyer, “Les accidents impliquant des enfants,” p. 120.
74 Duhaime, La construction du père québécois and “‘Les pères ont ici leur devoir.’” For a discussion of 
Father’s Day as an expression and performance of the new fatherhood in Quebec, see Gossage, “Celebrating 
the Family Man” (forthcoming 2018).
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father like Harry Pearce, as we have seen, might still in the 1950s construct his 
own pain at the loss of a cherished son as measurably less intense (about 33 per 
cent less, by his own estimate) than that of the boy’s mother.
 For Dads as defendants, on the other hand, the modern conception of fathers 
as engaged educators and role models—especially for their sons—was at the very 
heart of the matter. Richard Foley Sr., for instance, was held to account precisely 
for his failure to transmit to Richard Jr. the values associated with what Rutherdale 
calls “responsible family manhood”: values like honesty, honour, courage, 
hard work, sobriety, and a sense of duty.75 Dummitt adds a useful nuance here, 
suggesting that, while early twentieth-century conceptions of “the reasonable 
and responsible man” were framed as a moralistic call for “good character and 
self-restraint,” the discussion had shifted by the 1950s, when “the language of 
technocratic risk management” had taken over.76 Both of these points of emphasis 
can be read in the litigation around reckless, imprudent, or unfortunate sons that 
we have examined here, which extends from the 1920s into the 1950s. Clearly, 
judges were at some pains to assess the moral character of the offending youths. 
In so doing, they focused in particular on whether their fathers had provided them 
with a good example, effective discipline, appropriate supervision, and especially 
a solid secular and religious education. Young Solly Greenberg, who as we have 
seen burned another boy while playing with matches and gasoline, was “given the 
very best of character by his teacher, as to conduct, application and intelligence.” 
He also had the benefit, it emerged at trial, of “a religious teacher in religion 
attended weekly, if not daily, at the house of the defendant, and taught the Hebrew 
religion with all that that means, to this boy.”77 Just as clearly, however, judges 
were increasingly disposed to include admonitions about rational risk management 
in their rulings, as did Judge Hector Perrier, whose distinction between mere 
“skill” and true “competence” behind the wheel, whose insistence on wisdom of 
the minimum age for Quebec drivers (17 years at the time), and whose expression 
of shock that a boy’s parents would so cavalierly disregard that legislation and the 
expertise on which it was based we have already noted.78
 For Dummitt, modernity and masculinity converge around the inter-related 
ideas of courageous risk-taking and responsible risk management in the new, 
high-technology environment of postwar British Columbia. The idea that some 
preliminary version of Dummitt’s “manly modern” was already operating in 
Quebec in the interwar and early postwar period has been suggested by Magda 
Fahrni in her ongoing exploration of the experts and organizations that comprised 
what she calls the “accident-prevention infrastructure.”79 Lawsuits claiming 
a father’s liability for his son’s injurious acts offer another window onto this 
ideology while adding a fresh dimension: that of the father-son relationship as a 
75 See especially Rutherdale, “Three Faces of Fatherhood.”
76 Dummitt, The Manly Modern, pp. 126-127.
77 Martin, ès-qual. v. Greenberg, pp. 353-354.
78 Glencross v. Dame Charrest et autres.
79 See Fahrni, “La lutte contre l’accident” and especially her forthcoming essay entitled “Accident Prevention 
in Early Twentieth-Century Quebec and the Emergence of Masculine Technical Expertise” in Gossage and 
Rutherdale, eds., Masculine Histories in the Making (forthcoming 2018).
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key locus of its transmission. With the spread of powerful technologies, especially 
the automobile, new challenges and expectations emerged for teenagers and young 
men caught between the power, fun, and excitement of risk-taking behaviour and 
the exigencies of modern manhood, with all its emphasis on responsible risk 
management. The idea that fathers should teach their sons to manage this tension 
is revealed clearly in these cases, especially those that turned on section 1054 
of the Civil Code, the terms of which made paternal responsibility for damages 
caused by minor children a matter of law. In many cases, the failure to equip 
their sons with both a proper sense of masculine responsibility and the privileged 
bodies of knowledge required to safely operate modern machines like bicycles 
and rifles—but especially cars—was a failure to live up to the expectations of 
twentieth-century society with regard to the proper performance of the paternal 
role. Those failures are valuable, as in any historical study of transgression, 
mainly for what they tell us about the boundaries across which men as fathers 
(and thus as teachers and role models, especially for their sons) were not expected 
or, ultimately, permitted to stray.
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